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Introduction

because the ‘‘arms race’’ between hackers and the
security industry means that many of these solutions
require continuous updates.
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A

troubling change has taken place recently in malicious attacks over the Internet. 1 The motives of
attackers have shifted from the pursuit of thrills and the
acquisition of bragging rights to mercenary goals. The
attacks and attackers have become more organized and
professional. In particular, attackers have begun to
develop ‘‘botnets’’ or networks of infected computers
that they are able to control remotely. These botnets are
used to send spam, to circulate malware (such as viruses),
to steal confidential information, to launch distributed
denial of service (‘‘DDoS’’) attacks, 2 and to extort protection money from Web sites by threatening such attacks,
among other harmful uses. The key problem with
botnets is their ability to make use of large numbers of
computers at once. This makes profitable a broader
range of attacks, including those that would otherwise
not be worthwhile. 3 In addition, botnets can be sold or
rented out, and easily updated with new attack tools to
suit the needs of buyers in the underground botnet
market.
Vast quantities of resources are being devoted to
cyber security, fuelled by concern about our increasing
reliance on Internet communications as well as the
desire to ensure that the social and economic benefits of
the Internet are realized. However, despite investment,
the cyber insecurity problem remains. The current
approach to cyber security is often reactive rather than
preventative. Flawed software is remedied by the expensive patching process rather than by releasing robust
software in the first place. 4 Malware proliferates at a rate
that makes it difficult to produce new patches and new
virus signatures, and to deploy them at a sufficient pace
to avoid infections. 5 Harmful communications such as
spam or denial of service attacks are met with filtration
systems that consume financial and computing
resources, and slow legitimate traffic.
With the exception of personal firewalls, these solutions become available only after a vulnerability or attack
is identified, often after damage has already been caused.
Furthermore, these solutions are expensive and inconvenient given that they must be deployed on many computers. 6 Deployment is not the end of the matter

It is likely that some or all of these problems are not
being resolved in the most efficient manner possible.
The weak points, particularly in the case of botnets, are
the inadequately secured personal computers of average
users. These users do not face the full costs of their lack
of computer security. This is particularly the case now
that bot software is being designed to be minimally disruptive to the computer owner, so that bots may avoid
detection and removal. Accordingly, average users fail to
invest in security. They do not become educated about
security, they do not ensure that flaws in their software
are appropriately patched, nor do they demand secure
software from vendors in the first place. They either fail
to apply security measures such as anti-virus software or
firewalls or, if they do apply them, they do not maintain
them conscientiously. In economic terms, they impose
significant negative externalities on cyberspace. Although
a user’s personal investments in security will offer him or
her protection against some threats (such as spyware), the
user is otherwise dependent on the security investments
of others to avoid spam and DDoS attacks.
This paper will consider the possibility of using tort
liability to address cyber insecurity. In previous work, I
have proposed a hypothetical lawsuit by the victim of a
DDoS attack against the vendor of unreasonably insecure software, the flaws of which are exploited to create
the DDoS attack army. 7 Indeed, software vendors are
facing increasing public disapproval for their contributions to cyber insecurity. 8 However, not all DDoS attack
armies are assembled by exploiting flaws in software.
Computers are also infected when users voluntarily open
infected email attachments or download infected files
from file-sharing networks. Accordingly, the cyber insecurity resulting from the large numbers of average endusers with infected computers cannot be entirely
addressed by reducing the number of exploitable flaws
in widely-deployed software. It may be useful to find
additional ways to address other avenues of infection.
Some have argued that we should focus on modifying end-user behaviour or catching the criminals
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directly responsible for malware and cyber-attacks. As
discussed below, I suggest that effort of this sort is useful
but insufficient. Another possibility is to induce ISPs to
take a far more active role in (1) ensuring end-users’
computers are appropriately maintained in order to
reduce the risk of malware infection, and (2) monitoring
end-users’ computers so that infected computers can be
quarantined before they cause harm. An increase in ISP
control over subscribers’ computers would have some
negative consequences, and it would be necessary to consider whether the anticipated increase in cyber security is
a sufficient benefit to outweigh the potential harms.
Should it be decided that ISP liability is a useful
approach, the hypothetical lawsuit by the victim of a
DDoS attack that I described in earlier work could also
be brought against the ISP that hosted all or part of the
attacking botnet.
Part I of this paper will discuss the emerging
problem of bots and botnets. Part II will explore what
ISPs can do about botnets, and will briefly outline the
possible argument in tort that could be made by the
victim of a DDoS attack launched from an ISP’s network.

Part I — Overview of Bots and
Botnets

I

n the computer world, a bot (short for ‘‘robot’’) is a
software program that performs an automated process. While some bots are useful (such as those used by
search engines to browse through Web sites collecting
information to include in the search engine database),
malicious bots have also emerged and are a serious
threat to cyber security. The key components of a malicious bot (to which I refer simply as a ‘‘bot’’ in this paper)
are normally the following: a propagation mechanism, a
remote control function, and several actions that can be
taken by the bot at the direction of the controller. 9 The
feature that distinguishes bots from other forms of malicious code, or malware, is the use of a remote control
mechanism that permits them to be effectively
networked. These networks can be very large, consisting
of tens of thousands of linked systems, 10 which together
offer considerable computing power.
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infection, and also as malicious HTML code that runs
automatically when an email is viewed using certain
email client programs. 14 Bots can also infect users who
view maliciously designed Web sites using vulnerable
Internet browser software. 15 Many bots, such as the
Gaobot/Agobot, Mytob and Spybot families, use multiple methods to propagate. 16
Although many of the current bots contain their
own propagation mechanisms, not all bots do. Instead,
some simply connect to the botnet’s remote control
channel to await instructions after they are installed on a
computer. 17

Remote Control
Bots are distinguished from other forms of malware
due to their ability to form coordinated networks, or
‘‘botnets’’, under the command of the botnet controller. 18 This is achieved in a variety of ways.
One common method is to design bots that, once
installed on an infected computer, attempt to join specific Internet Relay Chat (‘‘IRC’’) communication channels. IRC is a system that enables multiple member discussions in forums called IRC channels under the
control of channel operators. 19 Once connected to the
designated IRC channel, the bots await further commands from the controller. 20 A botnet controller can
efficiently control numerous bots in this way. 21

Propagation

Botnets are vulnerable to disruption if they are
detected and their IRC channels are disabled. 22 Bot
designers have attempted to protect their botnets by
planting the IRC servers they use on compromised computers, 23 by encrypting communications with the botnet,
and by protecting access to the IRC channel by a password. 24 Another technique adopted by botnet controllers is to use a dynamic domain name service to identify
the location of the IRC server. In this way, if a botnet’s
IRC channel is shut down, the controller can move to
another location. The bots are designed to join a channel
on a server at a particular domain name that is registered
with the dynamic domain name service. If the IRC server
must move to a new IP address, the dynamic domain
name service takes care of the redirection and the bots
can find the new IRC server even though they continue
to look for the same domain name. 25

A computer can become infected with a bot in
numerous ways, and the creativity of malware writers
suggests that additional methods will arise. Bots can
spread through network connections by exploiting vulnerabilities in software (normally the Windows operating system), 11 by using backdoors installed on a computer during an earlier malware infection, and by
cracking weak passwords on network shares. 12 They can
also spread through peer-to-peer file-sharing networks by
adopting alluring filenames that induce other users to
download them. 13 They spread through email both as
attachments that users must open in order to trigger the

In addition, bot designers are moving to new
methods of communication. Symantec has observed two
bots that use their own encrypted peer-to-peer networks. 26 The advantage of a peer-to-peer network model
is that the detection and removal of one node will not
disrupt the network, thus avoiding the vulnerability associated with a centralized communication system like
IRC. 27 An example of a bot that uses peer-to-peer communication is Phatbot. The bots register themselves as
peers on the Gnutella network but use an atypical port
for communication, which serves to distinguish them
from normal participants in the Gnutella network. 28
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Symantec also describes bots that use an emailrelated protocol (POP3) to communicate. 29 The bots
connect to a predefined mail server to retrieve email
messages that contain commands in email attachments.
The bots can also respond to commands through the
same channel. Symantec notes that ‘‘[s]ince POP3 communication is not uncommon on most networks, this
traffic would be more likely to go undetected than a
connection to an IRC server. Additionally, ports used for
POP3 communication are less likely to be filtered or
blocked at the network perimeter’’. 30

The Uses of Botnets
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Botnet controllers can deliver instructions to the
bots through the IRC channel or other communication
channel. If a bot is not already designed to perform a
particular function, the bots are easy to update by
instructing them to download software from a specified
location. 31 Among the activities performed by botnets
are sending spam (including phishing email), gathering
and returning sensitive data to the controller, launching
DDoS attacks, and speeding the spread of other malware,
among other uses. 32
Spam and phishing
Spam, or unsolicited bulk email, has become a tremendous online annoyance. 33 Estimates from early 2005
of the proportion of email that is spam range from 68%
to 83%. Some of this email is more than merely
annoying. A ‘‘phishing’’ attempt is an email message that
attempts to trick the recipient into parting with confidential information by masquerading as a message from
a legitimate business such as a bank or eBay, and
requiring the victim to log in to confirm account details.
In an attempt to shut down spammers, multiple
‘‘block lists’’ 34 are available to assist email servers to reject
messages coming from IP addresses known to send
spam. Spammers have reacted to this defensive strategy
by relaying spam through compromised computers,
including those linked into botnets. In this way, spammers are able to avoid being blocked by spam block lists.
Symantec reports that within its list of the top 50
instances of malware, the proportion that contains emailrelaying capacity has been steadily increasing from 37%
in the last six months of 2003, to 47% in the first six
months of 2004, and 53% in the last six months of
2004. 35
Spying and theft of confidential information
Many of the common bots are designed to look for
confidential information in stored memory such as CD
keys for games, software product ID numbers, or passwords. 36 In addition, they may contain ‘‘packet sniffers’’
and ‘‘keystroke loggers’’ to look for sensitive information. 37 The increase in the prevalence of malicious code
designed to steal sensitive confidential information is
attributed to the growth of botnets, which facilitate the
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remote retrieval of this information. 38 In addition to the
theft of confidential information, bots can be used for
general privacy invasion. For example, the Spybot family
has been observed not only to log keystrokes and look
for stored passwords, but also to capture screenshots or
webcam footage. 39
Distributed denial of service attacks
Botnets are often used to launch DDoS attacks. Statistics on the level of DDoS activity vary, with Symantec
reporting a steady increase in DDoS attacks in the last
half of 2004. 40 The number of DDoS attacks reported in
the 2004 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey,
on the other hand, showed a decline when compared to
the 2003 data. In any event, DDoS attacks continued to
impose heavy costs, estimated at about $26 million in
2004 for the 269 respondents to the 2004 CSI/FBI
survey. 41
The motives for DDoS attacks are varied. One of the
troubling uses that has emerged recently, and which is
closely associated with botnets, is extortion. Starting in
about 2003, criminals began to threaten to disable
online betting companies with DDoS attacks during
peak gambling times unless the companies paid
thousands of dollars. 42 Other businesses that generate
significant revenue online are equally vulnerable to
DDoS-related extortion. 43
Another example illustrates the use of botnets ‘‘for
hire’’. In 2004, Jay Echouafni and his co-conspirators
were indicted in California after Echouafni paid a business partner to arrange for hackers to launch DDoS
attacks against his online business competitors. 44 The
attacks, which took place in 2003, cost the victims over
$2 million and disrupted services for their ISPs and other
sites. 45 Echouafni, however, paid $1,000 for the attacks,
which were launched from the hackers’ botnets. 46 He
claimed that his competitors had stolen some of his Web
site content and were themselves launching DDoS
attacks against his Web site. 47
DDoS attacks are occasionally used for political purposes. Examples include attacks by Indian hackers
against Pakistani government Web sites, 48 attacks on
Web sites associated with the Chechen rebel movement, 49 and a spate of attacks originating in China and
Korea against Japanese sites at a time of heightened tension between the countries. 50 DDoS attacks have also
been used, most likely by spammers, to attack spam
block-lists. 51
Accelerating the propagation of malware
Botnets can also be used to ‘‘pre-seed’’ computers
with malware in order to increase the speed of propagation and thus ensure an effective epidemic. It has been
suggested that the Witty worm was likely launched by a
botnet, as the worm broke out roughly at the same time
from a large number of computers distributed all over
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the world. 52 Symantec discovered that the Witty worm
was launched from computers that did not run the vulnerable software that Witty exploited, further suggesting
that it had been launched from a botnet. 53 Botnet
owners have also profited from their botnets by
installing adware, for which they are paid by online
advertising companies on a ‘‘per install’’ basis. 54
Other uses for botnets
Botnets can be used for online advertising fraud.
Where an advertiser contracts with a Web site to carry
its advertisement and the fee varies according to the
number of visitors clicking on the ad, a botnet can be
used to click on the ads to inflate the traffic in order to
defraud the advertiser. 55 Botnets can be used to manipulate online polls, since each bot has a distinct IP address
and appears to be a unique vote. 56 They are also used to
manipulate certain online games. 57
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The Future of Botnets
As the foregoing illustrates, botnets already present a
considerable danger. Unfortunately, this danger is
increasing. Reports of bot code increased steadily
through 2004, and the number of documented variants
of the three major bots (Randex, Gaobot and Spybot)
reached nearly 6,000 at the end of 2004. 58 McAfee
reports a three-fold increase in bot detection over the
first two quarters of 2005. 59
The future of botnets is quite worrisome. Botnets
will become increasingly effective as broadband access
spreads. 60 Furthermore, mounting evidence suggests that
botnets are increasingly used for financial gain, that the
newer bots are more sophisticated, and that their networks are increasingly difficult to disrupt. 61 Already
many of the established bot families take steps to evade
detection by terminating the processes of anti-virus
software on infected computers. 62 Some bots, such as
Polybot, possess polymorphic ability, or the ability to
‘‘mutate’’ to impede detection by anti-virus software that
depends upon specific virus signatures. 63 Polybot is modified each time it runs on an infected computer. 64
There is evidence that botnets are available for rent.
Botnets and zombies are reportedly available at prices of
5 to 10 cents per computer. 65 The market in botnets is
reasonably sophisticated, with dealers offering higher
quality bots (i.e., high-bandwidth machines and
machines located in jurisdictions where authorities are
perceived to be less likely to shut down bots 66) at a
premium, as well as making sales promotional offers. 67
The ‘‘business’’ of malware was revealed in a public
battle between rival gangs of malware writers in 2004.
When one group launched a worm designed to remove
a rival group’s worms from infected computers, the retaliatory worm contained insults and taunts along the following lines: ‘‘Hey, NetSky . . . don’t ruine our bussiness,
wanna start a war? [sic]’’ 68 The ability to generate money
by selling or renting out botnets or by offering attacks
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‘‘for hire’’ offers a powerful incentive to criminals who
would not be motivated by the thrills or the pursuit of
boasting rights that appear to have motivated hackers in
the past.

Part II — Liability of ISPs for the
harms caused by botnets

M

any parties contribute in some way to the botnet
problem. The obvious culprits are the writers of
malware, the botnet controllers, and the parties who rent
or pay for attacks by botnets. The criminal law exists to
deter and sanction this behaviour, but is clearly not sufficient. The scale of the problem and the forensic and
jurisdictional challenges of enforcement seem to have
greatly reduced the deterrent impact of the criminal
law. 69 These difficulties should not prevent the state
from continuing to pursue cyber-criminals to the extent
possible given limited resources, but it cannot be the sole
approach. It is also necessary to ensure that others who
are well-positioned to detect and prevent attacks take
reasonable steps to do so. 70
The end-users who fail to maintain the security of
their systems supply the computers that form botnets. 71
Increasingly, however, even conscientious end-users can
become infected. Systems are vulnerable due to the delay
between the discovery of a software flaw or a new piece
of malware and the implementation of a remedial patch
or anti-virus update. The US CERT notes three occasions
in 2005 of major system infections resulting from newly
discovered worm variants not included in the then-current anti-virus signatures. 72 Firewalls cannot protect
against infections delivered via normal processes such as
email or inadvertently browsing web sites infected with
malicious code. 73
The apparent lack of interest in the security of their
computers that is shown by average end-users is not
surprising. The average end-user does not have a good
understanding of computer and network security. Even
those end-users who do have a reasonable understanding
of security face the costs in time and money of installing
and maintaining security software, and patching software
flaws. Although programs such as Microsoft’s automatic
update system have eased the patching burden for the
average end-user, patches continue to cause problems.
They are expensive to manage in the context of enterprises, 74 and they periodically contain new flaws. 75
Another danger is that the patching system may be
hacked and users induced to download a compromised
patch. 76
The key problem, however, is that end-users do not
suffer most of the costs associated with the insecurity of
their computers. Furthermore, their investments in
security benefit others as much or more than they benefit the end-users. In other words, end-users suffer very
little when their computers are used to send spam or
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launch DDoS attacks, and any investment in securing
their own computers will not protect them against the
spam or DDoS attacks launched from the insecure computers of others. This is increasingly the case as writers of
malware become interested in assembling botnets to use
for financial gain. Bot software is designed not to disrupt
the infected computer, but to quietly participate in the
spam or attack activity directed by the botnet controller
against another party. A noisy or disruptive bot would
risk detection and removal by the owner of the infected
computer.
To the extent that end-users do suffer from their
own computer insecurity, as is the case with the theft of
confidential information by spyware, most appear to be
unaware of the threat, so it does little to encourage them
to secure their systems. While this suggests that there is
room for efforts to educate end-users, they will still not
face the costs of spam and DDoS, and this suggests that
they will under-invest in security. Some have suggested
that end-users could be fined or sued in order to cause
them to maintain system security. 77 This would, however, be expensive and would run into the difficulty that
many infected computers may be located in other jurisdictions.

Responsibility of Internet Service Providers
What can ISPs do?
ISPs, including providers of home Internet access,
universities and other network operators, are facing
increasing pressure to deal with the harms emanating
from bots on their networks. The Canadian government
released the report of its task force on spam in May of
2005. 78 The report recommends that ISPs and other network operators implement a set of best practices 79 to
combat spam. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission
announced ‘‘Operation Spam Zombies’’ in May 2005,
which encourages ISPs to take steps to protect their subscribers’ computers from being used to relay spam.
Should these exhortations be ignored, one suspects that
regulation might follow.
There are signs that the pressure on ISPs is starting
to come from private sector sources as well, including
the victims of DDoS attacks. A consortium of British
online gambling companies (which are often targeted by
DDoS extortion attempts) has started to lobby ISPs to
apply better security to combat DDoS attacks. 80 They are
asking ISPs to distribute firewalls to customers to monitor for, and shut down the flood of attack traffic emanating from, infected computers. Although they are currently asking for help, it is possible that they might
eventually attempt a lawsuit.
Some network operators are simply starting to
block email received from ranges of IP addresses
assigned to particular ISPs that harbour spammers. The

targeting appears to be somewhat imprecise, affecting
both infected computers that are relaying spam as well as
other subscribers. 81 The threat of having to deal with
subscribers upset by service interruption may cause ISPs
to take action to control bots on their networks.
There appear to be a variety of measures that ISPs
could take that would help to impede the propagation of
bot software (and thus suppress botnet creation) or to
throttle botnet activity on their networks. ISPs could (1)
enforce the application of software patches and anti-virus
updates on subscriber computers, (2) scan subscribers’
computers for known infections, 82 (3) periodically scan
subscribers’ computers to check the integrity of operating system, firewall and antivirus software, 83 (4) block
email attachments with file extensions commonly associated with infections or scan email attachments, (5) quarantine infected subscribers, 84 (6) block ports that are
associated with known software vulnerabilities, 85 (7)
block applications often used to transmit malware such
as peer-to-peer file-sharing, or (8) block all ports not
needed for a set of approved applications (e.g., e-mail,
web browsing). Some of these measures may have significant negative consequences, and constitute an unacceptable exchange of freedom and privacy for cyber security
improvements.
There are also many measures that ISPs could take
to reduce some of the key harms inflicted by botnets. In
addition to some of the measures mentioned above, the
Canadian spam report lists a set of ISP best practices, 86
including blocking port 25 on subscribers’ computers, 87
monitoring the volume of subscribers’ email traffic, and
rate-limiting their email. Additional recommendations
are aimed at encouraging communication and cooperation amongst network operators, as well as suppressing
address spoofing, and enhancing the traceability of
spam. 88 The U.S. FTC makes similar recommendations. 89
With respect to DDoS attacks, ISPs can enforce
‘‘egress filtering’’, which monitors IP packets sent from
their subscribers to detect false source addresses (a characteristic of some DDoS attacks). Other mechanisms
based on monitoring for traffic anomalies have also been
proposed to deal with DDoS. 90 Most ISPs seem to choose
not to invest in source-based preventative mechanisms
to forestall DDoS attacks on others. 91
What should ISPs do?
As noted above, there are many measures that ISPs
could adopt that would reduce the spread of bot
software and the damage done by botnets. Some ISPs are
reportedly already blocking port 25, limiting the number
of emails that a subscriber can send through the ISP’s
email server, and quarantining infected machines. 92
Some ISPs already block email attachments with certain
file extensions, 93 and others offer virus-scanning of
attachments before they are delivered to customers. 94
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The number of ISPs taking preventative measures
and/or the type of measures adopted so far appear to be
insufficient to deal with botnets. Botnets are proliferating, even on the networks of ISPs that offer security
services to subscribers. Prolexic, a provider of anti-DDoS
filtering services, provides a summary of attack traffic
from the first two quarters of 2005, showing the top
twenty infected networks worldwide. 95 The list includes
numerous ISPs who provide free anti-virus software, personal firewalls and other security protections. 96
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Stronger measures such as enforced system monitoring, patching and updating, and the application at
source of anti-DDoS measures may be advisable, but
such measures may raise costs and annoy subscribers. If
an ISP invests too much in security, to the benefit of
everyone connected to the Internet, while competing
ISPs do not, it may lose price-sensitive subscribers. 97 Subscriber reaction to intrusive safety measures would likely
depend upon the sophistication of the subscribers as
well as the measures taken. It is possible that ISPs will be
unwilling to take the stronger measures, such as monitoring for and suspending individual accounts, as they
would have to deal with telephone calls from confused
and angry subscribers. 98
ISPs will undoubtedly have some incentive to try to
deal with botnets on their networks. These motivations
include reducing complaints from the recipients of
harmful traffic (some of whom may be their own subscribers), limiting the consumption of network resources
by spam and DDoS sent by botnets, and avoiding the
possibility of having some traffic blocked by other ISPs.
However, they will not face the full costs of botnets since
many of the harms will be borne by others. As a result,
one might suspect that ISPs will take some measures, but
may not take the optimal level of care to shut down
botnets.
Two ways in which ISPs could be encouraged to
deal with botnets are regulation or liability for the harms
caused by botnets on their networks. I will not consider
regulation further in this paper, except to note that ISPs
are strongly opposed to the idea of regulation, arguing
that rapid technological change and the need to permit
flexibility in implementing security measures militate
against codifying requirements by regulation. 99 The
other possibility is liability in negligence to the victim of
a botnet attack emanating, in whole or in part, from an
ISP’s network. Before discussing some of the arguments
involved in such a lawsuit, I will turn now to the reasons
why we might not wish to encourage ISPs to increase
their control of subscriber activities.
A number of arguments could be raised against
holding ISPs liable for botnet attacks. First, ISPs could
take measures that would unacceptably invade subscriber privacy. Second, ISPs could impose so many limitations on subscriber activity that individual freedom
and innovation would be curtailed. Third, once ISPs are
required to increase their ability to control traffic flows
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for security purposes, they may more easily use this
power for illegitimate purposes. Fourth, smaller ISPs will
not be able bear the costs of precautions as they do not
have the economies of scale open to larger ISPs. 100 Fifth,
the increase in prices associated with additional security
measures will squeeze out marginal subscribers. 101 Sixth,
the pressure on others, such as end-users, to take reasonable steps to address cyber security will be reduced, and
the pursuit of innovative ways to assist end-users to protect themselves will be abandoned in favour of innovation aimed at assisting ISPs to monitor and control their
networks. 102 Seventh, imposing liability on domestic ISPs
will not be effective in preventing the harms of botnets,
as they will merely relocate to other jurisdictions.
These are valid concerns, and it is difficult to answer
many of them. In deciding whether or not it is wise to
encourage or permit the courts to impose liability on
ISPs for botnets, it will be necessary to consider whether
the improvements in cyber security to be expected are
worth tolerating the negative consequences.
There are dangers in shifting to an increasingly
active role for ISPs in the control of information flowing
through their systems. ISPs may begin to censor or control traffic for their own purposes. In a recent incident, a
Canadian ISP blocked access by its subscribers to a Web
site run by a labour union of its employees that was
attempting to publicize its views about a labour dispute. 103 Clark Ray notes the danger that ISPs might be
tempted to collect information for resale to vendors or
advertisers, to apply software updates unrelated to
security, or to examine files unrelated to software maintenance (e.g., searching for unlicensed software or unlicensed music files). 104 Users might be able to protect
their privacy to some extent by encrypting files. 105
There is also a danger that holding ISPs liable for
botnet attacks will cause them to limit excessively the
nature of the service they offer, perhaps blocking all but
a list of approved ports and applications. A more moderate response would be to block only those ports
known to be associated with problems. The example of
the blocking of port 25 suggests that the market may
respond to meet the needs of more sophisticated users
who find themselves stymied by the port block. When
ISPs began to block port 25, new services emerged to
meet the requirements of users who wished to continue
to run their own mail servers. 106 This type of circumvention is likely not to be a problem because sophisticated
users can be expected to maintain the security of their
systems.
Another difficulty is that the infected computers
may reside on the networks of foreign ISPs. In fact, if ISP
liability is successful in reducing the ease with which
botnets can be assembled, one would expect that botnets
would migrate to other jurisdictions. Parties seeking to
pursue foreign ISPs would find it more challenging to
sue as a practical matter due to the issue of legal jurisdiction. The concern that botnets might migrate to more
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congenial jurisdictions is buttressed by the observation
that, in the underground zombie trade, the price of
zombies hosted in certain countries is higher because
they are considered less likely to be shut down. 107 To the
extent that foreign ISPs permit this to occur, they could
be black-listed and communications from them refused
or limited. There are precedents for black-listing foreign
servers that are significant sources of spam. 108

vehicles may be liable if they leave keys behind when it
is reasonably foreseeable that the vehicles may be stolen
and cause injury to others. 120 These cases reveal that a
defendant may be liable to a plaintiff in negligence for
creating an unreasonable risk of attack by an intervening
third party. As a result, there is precedent for an argument that ISPs, by failing to prevent or disable botnets
on their networks, are creating a situation of risk of harm
to DDoS victims at the hands of the botnet controllers.

ISP Liability for Botnet Attacks

The lawsuit by the victim of DDoS does face some
hurdles under current tort law. First, the defendant ISP
might argue that it does not owe a duty of care to the
plaintiff. Second, the ISP might argue that the plaintiff’s
losses are ‘‘pure economic losses’’, the recovery of which
is restricted in negligence cases. Finally, the ISP might
argue that the plaintiff is contributorily negligent for
failing to employ anti-DDOS services.

The suggestion that ISPs be held liable in negligence if they fail to take reasonable steps to prevent
attacks by botnets on their networks runs counter to the
widespread tendency to treat ISPs as immune from liability for the content of traffic on their networks. For
example, the Canadian Human Rights Act, 109 the Canadian Copyright Act 110 as discussed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in Society of Composers, Authors and
Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet
Providers, 111 and the recently tabled amendments to the
Canadian Copyright Act 112 provide some immunity to
network operators who merely provide a transmission
conduit for communications. In the United States, courts
have interpreted very broadly the legislation immunizing ISPs from liability, to the increasing consternation
of several American commentators. 113 For example,
Rustad and Koenig argue that ISP immunity should be
pared back in order to make ISPs ‘‘more accountable to
the public for excessive preventable dangers in cyberspace’’. 114 The authors point out that ‘‘ISPs . . . are no
longer delicate infants that need absolute immunity in
order to survive’’. 115
It is possible that this tendency to treat ISPs as
immune from responsibility for activities on their networks might impede the legal argument advanced in
this paper. Nevertheless, I will now turn to the hypothetical lawsuit by the victim of a DDoS attack against the
defendant ISP(s) that hosted the attacking botnet.
The victim of the DDoS attack is well-suited to be a
plaintiff in the proposed lawsuit. The DDoS victim
might suffer the scale of loss that would motivate a lawsuit. The DDoS ‘‘for hire’’ case described earlier inflicted
over $2 million in losses on the three businesses
attacked. 116 The 2004 CSI/FBI survey reported that the
269 respondents estimated their losses from DDoS in
2004 at $26 million. 117 Groups of DDoS victims have
already identified ISPs as capable of stemming the
attacks. 118
Tort law does permit liability to be imposed on a
defendant in situations in which the harm to the plaintiff is caused most directly by a third party. The defendant may be held responsible where he or she creates a
situation of unreasonable risk such that a plaintiff will be
harmed by a third party. 119 For example, Canadian
courts have held landlords responsible where their inadequate security measures expose tenants to attack by
unknown third parties. Similarly, those having care of

A plaintiff in a negligence case must establish that
the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care. The
Canadian legal test to determine the existence of a duty
of care in a novel situation involves two steps. 121 First the
court must determine if there is a ‘‘relationship of proximity’’ between the plaintiff and the defendant, and
whether the harm to the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s acts. Second, the
court must consider if there are residual policy considerations that suggest that a duty of care should not be
recognized in the circumstances. The meaning of ‘‘proximity’’ has caused great perplexity, but it appears to exist
where the relationship between plaintiff and defendant
is sufficiently ‘‘close and direct’’ that the defendant ought
to foresee that its carelessness might harm the plaintiff
and that it is just and fair that the defendant be required
to take care to avoid harming the plaintiff. 122
I have argued in an earlier paper that vendors of
software that has achieved near complete market share
are in a sufficient relationship of proximity with all users
of cyberspace because their software in large measure
determines the structure and security of cyberspace for
everyone. 123 ISPs do not have the same sort of necessary
connection to the users of cyberspace as the vendor of
widely-deployed software, since the ISP market is more
fragmented, and the available statistics suggest that the
most infected network (aol.com) is responsible for about
5% of bots in the world, and 11% of bots in the U.S. 124
This suggests a lesser connection to everyone in cyberspace than a software vendor with near complete market
share.
It may be necessary to consider a form of ‘‘cyberproximity’’, or proximity that is tailored to cyberspace. It
is clear that the Internet presents a seemingly intractable
challenge to law enforcement and security by virtue of
the unprecedented level of worldwide interconnection
involvrd, and the volume of communication. We may
need to move to a more broadly distributed model of
responsibility in which everyone is responsible for the

20
harms that his or her corner of the network may cause to
everyone else on the network.
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This would result in a more expansive conception
of duty than traditional tort law might otherwise have
imposed, but I do not feel it is an unreasonable or revolutionary step. The principle being invoked in the cyberspace context, namely that of taking care not to create
situations of risk that might foreseeably be exploited by
criminals to attack others, is the same as that applied in
the physical world in the case of keys left in a vehicle. 125
The number of parties to which one owes a duty of care
is greater in the cyberspace context by virtue of the high
level of interconnection between people made possible
by the Internet. The increased degree of interdependence (particularly with respect to security) among those
participating in cyberspace is also a feature of this environment, such that it is arguably ‘‘just and fair’’ to require
participants to look out for each other. Leaving keys in a
vehicle in one city is unlikely to injure anyone on the
other side of the globe, but maintaining an insecure
network could easily injure many people. An overly limited vision of proximity and thus of duty of care would
fail to recognize this fact.
Assuming the proximity hurdle can be passed, it is
reasonably simple to pass the foreseeability hurdle. As
trade groups such as the consortium of British online
gambling companies mentioned earlier begin to lobby
ISPs to apply better security to combat DDoS attacks, 126
the harm to e-commerce enterprises resulting from
botnet-driven DDoS activity is becoming impossible to
ignore.
The losses suffered by the DDoS victim are most
likely to be ‘‘pure economic losses’’ (i.e., economic losses
that arise independent of any physical injury to person
or to property) flowing from the interruption in the use
of the victim’s computer services. The victim might
suffer loss of business, harm to goodwill and wasted
employee time and effort. The victim is unlikely to have
lost data, which would have made it possible to argue
that data ought to be treated as property. 127 The DDoS
victim could sue the perpetrator of the attack for the
economic losses using one of the intentional business
torts such as interference with contractual relations, or
interference with economic relations by unlawful
means. 128 However, because the defendant ISP is being
pursued using a negligence theory rather than a vicarious
liability theory, the plaintiff faces the problem that the
recovery of pure economic loss through a negligence
lawsuit has been restricted by common law courts.
Common law courts have been reluctant to permit
the recovery of pure economic loss due to the risk of
indeterminate liability, 129 the fear that lawsuits will proliferate and absorb too many scarce judicial resources, 130
the need to respect and protect contractual allocations of
loss, and the desire to preserve the vigorous free market
competition that might be discouraged by the prospect
of liability for the negligently inflicted pure economic
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loss of a competitor. 131 In addition, pure economic losses
are viewed as ‘‘less compelling of protection than bodily
security or proprietary interests’’. 132 Despite all of these
concerns, however, Canadian and U.S. courts permit the
recovery of negligently inflicted pure economic loss in
certain circumstances. 133
One useful analogy to the present problem is provided by the American case, Union Oil Co. v. Oppen. 134
In that case, fishermen successfully sought compensation
for lost commercial fishing profits from oil companies
that caused a major oil spill. Feldthusen suggests that this
was the correct result given that the oil companies were
best situated to avoid the harm, and because there is no
private party available to sue for property damage in the
case of a public resource. There was, accordingly, a strong
deterrence argument for permitting the plaintiffs to
recover for economic losses resulting from damage to a
public resource. 135 This reasoning is applicable in the
context of DDoS attacks. The Internet has arguably
attained the status of a public resource, which is endangered because the parties best-positioned to address
cyber insecurity (including ISPs and vendors of software)
do not face the full costs of insecurity and accordingly do
not invest the optimal level of effort in remedying the
problem.
Another counter-argument that the defendant ISP
might raise is that the victim of the DDoS attack was
contributorily negligent in failing to take self-defensive
steps. Plaintiffs who fail to use safety devices, particularly
car seatbelts, are often considered to have been contributorily negligent. 136 ‘‘The essence of the argument is that
the plaintiff’s failure to employ the device was unreasonable, and that this unreasonable conduct was a contributing cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.’’ 137 In another Canadian case, the plaintiff poultry farmer’s failure to plug in
a power failure alarm system on the night that the defendant negligently cut the power lines was considered contributory negligence. The evidence was inconsistent on
how many other farmers employed these systems, but
25%–50% likely did. 138
It appears that the failure to take reasonable selfprotective measures might leave a plaintiff open to a
charge of contributory negligence. In the case of DDoS,
the self-defensive options are limited. Anti-DDoS services
are reported to cost $12,000 per month when supplied
by large US ISPs. 139 It is uncertain whether these services
can handle all forms of DDoS and it is difficult to determine the accuracy of the claims made by such service
providers. 140 These services seem sufficiently immature,
expensive and inconsistently deployed that it would be
unlikely that the failure to use them would be construed
as contributory negligence. Nevertheless, the possibility
remains that parties who are at considerable risk of
DDoS and stand to lose large sums might be expected to
take such steps.
Should a duty of care be found to be owed by a
defendant ISP to the victim of a DDoS attack, a court
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would have to determine the requisite standard of care.
In other words, what actions would the law consider
reasonably required of ISPs to prevent harms emanating
from botnets on their networks? As noted earlier in this
paper, there appear to be a variety of measures that ISPs
could take that would help to impede the propagation of
bot software (and thus suppress botnet creation), or to
throttle botnet activity on their networks. Many of the
measures designed to prevent the creation of botnets
and the spread of bot software have negative consequences for subscriber privacy and freedom. It might be
preferable to encourage ISPs to focus on effective sourcebased preventive tools. Using these techniques, ISPs can
monitor traffic emanating from their own networks and
throttle attacks launched against third parties. Experts
studying the problem of DDoS note the desirability of
such approaches and suggest that incentives for ISPs to
deploy them are currently insufficient. 141 Potential liability may encourage ISPs to develop and apply such
tools effectively.
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Conclusion

C

yber insecurity continues to create significant and
increasing concern, particularly with respect to the
national security implications. Although vast quantities
of resources are employed to address the cyber security
problem, the steps taken so far are proving inefficient
and insufficient. The parties best placed to take steps to
address cyber insecurity, including software vendors,

ISPs, and end-users do not face the full consequences of
their contributions to cyber insecurity. Accordingly, they
do not invest time and money to the socially optimal
level of improved security.
In previous work, I have suggested that software
vendors should face liability in negligence for unreasonably insecure software. This would help to reduce
malware that is spread by exploiting software vulnerabilities. However, malware is also spread due to the careless
behaviour of end-users in opening infected files. It is
likely to be inefficient to pursue individual end-users to
induce them to maintain the security of their systems.
Instead, ISPs and other network operators are well-positioned to enforce security in subscribers’ computers. A
range of security measures that vary in their degree of
intrusiveness are open to ISPs. Some of these measures
may be so harmful to individual liberty and privacy that
they are not worth the security improvement to be
gained. Nevertheless, it is likely that some measures, such
as enforced software patching and anti-virus software
maintenance, as well as source-based DDoS attack prevention should be taken.
Should ISPs not take reasonable steps to prevent
DDoS attacks launched by botnets harboured on their
networks, they ought to be liable in negligence to the
DDoS attack victims. While groups of DDoS attack victims are so far restricting themselves to lobbying ISPs to
take security measures, they may soon find it worthwhile
to sue.
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